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The Utah Department of Administrative Services
(the "Department") respectfully submits this brief in reply
to the answering briefs of the Stipulating Parties.

I.

!/

THE ASSERTIONS OF THE STIPULATING PARTIES THAT
THE ORIGINAL SUPREME COURT DECISION WAS LIMITED
TO JURISDICTION AND WAS OTHERWISE DICTA CONTRADICT POSITIONS TAKEN BY THOSE PARTIES IN THIS CASE.
Throughout their briefs, the Stipulating Parties

attempt to confine the scope of the original decision of
this Court in this case to the issue of the Public Service
Commission's ("Commission") jurisdiction over certain oil
and gas properties.

Thus, state the Division and the Com-

mittee, "This Court's holding in the Wexpro Case declared
jurisdictional law, but directed no specific plan or result."
Joint Brief of Utah Department of Business Regulation,
Division of Public Utilities and Utah Committee of Consumer
Services ("Joint Brief") at 26.

Mountain Fuel states, "[I]t

is clear that the Opinion does not mandate specific regulatory conduct.

H

Answering Brief of Mountain Fuel

Supply Company and Wexpro Company ("Mountain Fuel Brief") at
32, n. 13.

1.

See also Mountain Fuel Brief at 6, n. 4, and 8.

This Brief shall sometimes refer collectively to Mountain
Fuel Supply Company ("Mountain Fuel"), Wexpro Company
(nwexpro"), the Utah Department of Business Regulation,
Division of Public Utilities ("Division 11 ) and the
Utah Committee of Consumer Services ("Committee"), as
the "Stipulating Parties." The Utility Shareholder
Association of Utah, Alex Oblad and Harold Burton shall
be referred to as the "Shareholder Association."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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The parties incorporated their limited interpretation of
this Court's decision in the Stipulation.
However, in Committee of Consumer Services v. Public
Service Corrrrnission of Utah, 595 P.2d 871 (Utah 1979),
the Utah Supreme Court reversed the Order of the Commission on. jurisdictional grounds and remanded the
issue to the Commission for further hearings.
Stipulation ,!l.13, R. 03548

(emphasis added).

The Stipulating Parties' attempt to characterize
this Court's decision as solely jurisdictional, as merely
suggestive, Mountain Fuel Brief at 9, and as "direction and
guidance", Joint Brief at 3, flies in the face of the

posi~

tion taken previously by each of the Stipulating Parties.
The Stipulating Parties' denial that this Court's
decision declared that as a matter of law the public interest
requires that the oil profits from utility assets be used to
reduce future rates; that the Commission must decide, before
Wexpro or Celsius can exist, whether it is in the public
interest for Mountain Fuel to split its oil and gas exploration function with a subsidiary; that if Wexpro exists it
is, by nature of its gas plant, a public utility; and that
Mountain Fuel cannot pay Wexpro or Celsius market prices for
gas and pass the entire cost to ratepayers, is a denial
directly contrary to the positions taken by these parties
when other positions were more convenient to their aims.

-2-
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In Mountain Fuel's and Wexpro's Petition for Writ
of Certiorari to the United States Supreme Court ("Mountain
Fuel Petition for Certiorari"), Appendix "A" to Brief of
Utah Department of Administrative Services ("Department
Brief"), Mountain Fuel and Wexpro stated:
Upon direct appeal, -the Utah Supreme- Court, in a
divided opinion, held that the non-utility oil
properties had always been and are utility assets,
and that these properties and the oil revenues generated from them should be "applied to reduce the
cost of gas" to the Utah utility customer.
Mountain Fuel Petition for Certiorari at 13 (emphasis added).
[T]he court majority, on the basis of a
new theory that Mountain Fuel stood in a "trust
relationship" when it sold natural gas to its
utility customers . . . held that (i) sales of
interstate gas by Wexpro to Mountain Fuel must be
at the cost-of-service price rather than the federal
ceiling price, even when the gas comes from acreage
independently developed by Wexpro . . . and (ii) Wexpro,
along with any other company in interstate corrunerce
that sells jointly developed gas to Mountain Fuel, is
itself a public utility s·ubject to Utah regulation.Id. at 14

(emphasis added) .

These concepts, taken together, leave no room for
Mountain Fuel or Wexpro to conduct a non-utility
business in oil or gas, subject Wexpro to Utah regulation
as a public utility, and require Wexpro to sell gas to
Mountain Fuel at cheap prices . . . far below the
federal ceiling level for comparable vintage supply.
Id.

(emphasis added).
This case is mature for review by this Court because
the federal questions have been resolved with
finality, the regulation and taking are certain and
all that remains is an accounting proceeding.
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Id. at n. 7 (emphasis added).

Mountain Fuel's and Wexpro's

new position, which attempts to limit the decision's scope,
should be accorded by this Court whatever credibility it can
muster in light of their conveniently changed position.
The Division's and Committee's position·that the
decision was solely jurisdictional is entitled to absolutely
no credibility--indeed, the Division is judicially estopped
from taking that position.

In their Brief in Opposition to

Mountain Fuel's Petition for Certiorari

to the United

States Supreme Court ("Brief Opposing Certiorari"), Appendix
"B" to the Department's Brief, the Division and the Committee
stated to the United States Supreme Court:
The Utah Supreme Court held with regard to the
oil and gas properties held in Mountain Fuel's nonutility accounts (1) such properties were utility
properties, and (2) such properties should be
included in Mountain Fuel's utility accounts for
ratemaking purposes . . . . The bottom line of the Utah
Supreme Court's decision ~as that the net profits
from Mountain Fuel's oil properties beyond all
costs associated with their production, including
the cost of capital, should be applied to the
benefit of the Utah ratepayers through a reduction
in their future rates.
(Citations omitted.)

* * *
The Supreme Court of Utah, in light of these past
practices, adopted a "no-profit-to-affiliates" rule
which prohibited such intracompany profits from
being included in consumer rates, and applied that
rule to the Mountain Fuel-Wexpro option so as to prevent any profit realized by Wexpro under that option
from being passed on to Mountain Fuel's ratepayers.
The Utah Supreme Court also held that Wexpro, by
reason of its relationship as a wholly-owned subsidiary of Mountain Fuel and the unique relationship
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between Mountain Fuel and Wexpro created under the
Purchase and Sale Agreement and the Joint Exploration Agreement, was, under Utah law, a public
utility.

* * *
The Supreme Court not only set aside the Purchase
and Sale Agreement and the Joint Exploration Agreement, the Supreme Court of Utah left open the question of whether Wexpro is to exist at all.
Brief Opposing Certiorari at 14-16 (emphasis added).
Moreover, the Division and the Committee now give as
one basis for limiting the scope of this Court's decision
the consistent "understanding of the Division and the
Committee, that a portion of the oil profits would be
retained by the shareholders to compensate for that risk of
development assumed by the shareholders . .
at 8.

II

Joint Brief

That is a categorical misstatement of the Division's

and Committee's consistent position.

Until the Stipulation

and Agreement, it was always the position of the Division
and Committee that the shareholders had never assumed any of
the risk of development and that this Court's decision held
that all oil profits from utility assets must be used to
reduce rates.

Not only did the Division argue to the United

States Supreme Court the positions quoted at pages 4-5,
supra, but the Division repeatedly argued to the Commission
after remand that this Court had decided that the ratepayers
are entitled to all of the oil profits because they have
borne all of the risk of exploration and development.
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In its Hearing Brief on Remand, the Division stated:
To the ·extent this Commission considers any issue other
than classification and the reduction of rates to the
extent of all net oil and gas profits or to the extent
this Commission considers any issue in a manner
inconsistent with the Utah Supreme Court's opinion,
then this Commission is not within its statutory
mandate, and its actions will be contrary to law.
Id. at R. 02491-92

(emphasis added).

To the extent that portion of the [Commission's
Prehearing] Order means less than all of the net
oil profits on all utility assets are to be applied
to reduce the cost of gas, that portion of the Order
is not in accordance with the Supreme Court opinion
and must be stricken.
Id. at R. 02492-93 (emphasis added).

See also id. at R.

02486, 02487-88, 02490, 02493, 02494, 02496, 02500.
The Division further argued in its Memorandum in
Opposition to Motions to Enlarge Scope of Prehearing Order:
"[N]on-utility" net income in 1977, 1978 and 1979,
derived from properties developed with ratepayer risk
money, totaled an additional $31,103,000.
These
profits must be accounted for to ratepayers in this
proceeding.
R. 02270.
The Division has now for the first time adopted
the contribution theory, a theory propounded by Mountain
Fuel after its Petition for Certiorari was denied by the
United States Supreme Court.
theory tooth and nail.

The Division fought that

In the Division's Motion to Strike

Prefiled Testimony, R. 02206, the Division moved to strike
any evidence relevant to the "contribution" theory.

The

Division argued that the contribution theory was foreclosed
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because this Court had already finally determined that the
ratepayers had assumed all of the risks.
The Division's and Committee's change of position,
and their refusal to acknowledge that their positions are
changed, are especially surprising since prior to the
settlement they took Mountain Fuel and Wexpro to task for
that very ploy.

In its Hearing Brief on Remand before the

Commission, the Division argued:
Mountain Fuel is not entitled under our law to
tell the United States Supreme Court that the Utah
Supreme Court's decision means one thing, and then
after failing to gain review on certiorari, to change
its story and tell this Commission that the Utah
Supreme Court's decision means exactly the opposite.
A party to litigation is not permitted to assume
inconsistent or mutually contradictory positions with
respect to the same matter in the same or a successive
series of suits.
Scarano v. Central R. Co. of New
Jersey, 203 F.2d 510, 513 (1953). Parties are not
allowed to play "fast and loose with the courts,"
an evil the courts should not tolerate.
Intentional
self-contradiction used as a means of obtaining
unfair advantage is an affront to judicial dignity.
Id.
R.

02498.
The same proscriptions apply to all the Stipu-

lating Parties, including the Division and the Committee.

See

Roy S. Ludlow Investment Co. v. Salt Lake County, 551 P.2d
1259 (Utah 1976); Provo City Corp. v. Cropper, 28 Utah 2d 1,
497 P.2d 629 (1972).

~also

Standage Ventures, Inc. v.

State of Arizona, 114 Ariz. 480, 562 P.2d 360 (1977); Cf.
Citizens Bank v. C&H Construction & Paving Co., Inc., 89
N.M.

360, 552 P. 2d 796

(1976).
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II.

THE STIPULATING PARTIES' POSITION THAT THE
COMMISSION WAS FREE TO IGNORE THIS COURT'S
DECISION AND FASHION ITS OWN RELIEF INDEPENDENT
OF THIS COURT'S PRONOUNCEMENTS IHSCONCEIVES
THIS COURT'S DECISION AND HISCONCEIVES THE
PROPER SCOPE OF THIS COURT'S REVIEW.
Mountain Fuel and Wexpro argue that the Commission

is free to ignore this Court's decision and "to fashion a
new and different solution to the problem."
Brief at 38.

Mountain Fuel

The Division and the Committee argue that this

Court ''could not bind the Commission's discretion to formulate an appropriate regulatory treatment to be accorded
[utility] properties," and that "[t]he Agency is free, within
the declared law, to take a totally new approach to the
problem."

Joint Brief at 27.

The Stipulating Parties rely

for these propositions on F.C.C. v. Pottsville Broadcasting
Co., 309 U.S. 134 (1940); National Labor Relations Board v.
Food Store Employees Union, 417 U.S. 1 (1974); and S.E.C. v.
Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
Such reliance is misplaced.

Not one of these

cases supports the freedom of an administrative agency to
ignore the mandate and order of a jurisdiction's supreme
arbiter.
Moreover, to the extent the Stipulating Parties
premise their position on this Court's having overstepped
the proper bounds of review by "fashioning a remedy,·" they
have misconceived both what this Court's decision did and
the state of administrative law.

This Court held, inter
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alia, that as a matter of law, the public interest (a) requires
that the ratepayers have the benefits of net oil profits
from utility assets through a reduction in rates and (b) prohibits profits from wholesale sales between Mountain Fuel
and wholly-owned subsidiaries from being charged to ratepayers
in the retail price 0£ gas.

Along with the other holdings of

the.decision, these are legal determinations, and are unquestionably within this Court's power and responsibility.

In

essence, the Stipulating Parties' argument is that this
Court does not have the power to declare, define, and determine the law of this state.

That is preposterous.

The question whether the public interest requires
as a matter of law the utilization of the principle "gain
follows risk" is a question of law.

~/

The majority clearly

decided it as a question of law:
When the expenses to develop the utility properties
were included in the rate base, the ratepayers were
entitled to share in the benefit by having the net
profits on the oil, and other hydrocarbon substances,
sold by Mountain Fuel to others, applied to reduce
the cost of gas.
595 P.2d at 876

2.

(citations omitted).

The Stipulating Parties rely on Empire Electric Ass'n
v. Public Service Commission, 604 P.2d 930 (Utah 1979),
which held that the C01mnission had considerable latitude
of expression in determining the public interest.
The
Department agrees with that proposition.
But that
proposition implicitly recognizes that there are latitudes of discretion beyond the Commission's power.
Those are the latitudes wherein this Court can determine as a matter of law that the public interest is or
is not served.
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No court has yet held that the question of the
proper allocation, between investors and customers, of gains
on utility assets, is not a legal question subject to appellate review and substitution of judgment.
To the contrary, the appellate courts which have
decided the question on review from administrative agencies
have decided it as a question of law.

In fact, in adopting

the legal principle "gain follows risk," this Court implicitly
followed the decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia in Democratic Central Committee v.
Washington M.A.T. Commission, 485 F.2d 786 (D.C. Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 935 (1974).
(Wilkins, J. dissenting).

See 595 P.2d 893

Democratic Central Committee, in

a painstaking analysis of the "gain follows risk" issue,
determined it after tracing its adjudicative history through
appellate courts and agencies.

Democratic Central Committee

cited New York Water Service Corporation v. Public Service
Commission, 12 App.Div. 2d 122, 208 N.Y.S. 2d 857 (1960);
and City of Lexington v. Lexington Water Co., 458 S.W.2d 778
(Ky. 1970), where appellate courts decided the issue.

Those

courts did not consider it outside the scope of appellate
review.
The Division's argument that this Court's decision
"could not bind the Commission's discretion to formulate an
appropriate regulatory treatment to be accorded such properties," Joint Brief at 27, is absolutely contradicted by
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Democratic Central Committee, which is respectfully commended
to this Court's

att~ntion

for careful scrutiny.

Undeniably, appellate courts have jurisdiction to
review legal deterrr.inations of administrative agencies.
See, 4 K.C. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, Ch. 30 (1st
Ed. 1958)

{Supp. 1976 and 1982).

While it is often difficult

to divide legal questions from factual questions, id.,
Democratic Central Committee, New York Water Service Corp.
and Lexington Water Company make clear that this question is
a legal one.
Likewise, the no-profits-to-affiliates question;
the question whether an entity with a gas plant is a public
utility; and the question whether the Commission can allow
Mountain Fuel to split its utility function with a subsidiary
without an adequate hearing, are legal questions.

The fact

that the relief which the Commission must apply on remand-e. g., a roll-in of oil profits to reduce rates--flows inexorably
from legal determinations on these questions does not make
them any less legal determinations.
This Court's legal determinations were well within
its power.

Pottsville Broadcasting, Food Store Employees and

Chenery, are inapposite here.

None of those cases involved

the failure of an administrative agency to follow the law of
the case; or to follow the directives of a supreme tribunal
or intermediate appellate tribunal; or to follow an appellate mandate; or to consider an appellate court's legal
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pronouncements as binding.

None of those cases dealt with

the abject failure by an administrative agency to follow the
law--in short, none of those cases dealt with the question
herein presented.

Indeed, Pottsville Broadcasting itself held:

On review the court may . . . correct errors of
law and on remand the Commission is bound to act
upon the correction.
309 U.S. at 145.

lf

In fact, the cases which are on point have distinguished Pottsville Broadcasting and Food Store Employees on
grounds directly applicable to the instant case.
In Chicago & Northwestern Transportation Co. v.
United States, 574 F.2d 926, 929-30 (7th Cir. 1978), the
Seventh Circuit held the doctrine of "law of the case"

3.

There is no broad principle of administrative law as
stated in Pottsville Broadcasting.
In fact,
The sweep of Pottsville was cut back when Congress,
on July 16, 1952, amended 47 U.S.C. §402 by adding
subsection (h), providing that in the event of a
court decision reversing an order and remanding
the case to the FCC "to carry out the judgment of
the court" the FCC has the duty "unless otherwise
ordered by the court, to do so upon the basis of
the proceedings already had and the record which
said appeal was heard and determined." The
Committee report stated that the addition was
"intended to confer upon the appellate court a
measure of control commensurate with the dignity
and responsibility of that tribunal.
Greater Boston Television Corporation v. Federal
Communications Commission, 463 F.2d 268, 281-82
(D.C. Cir. 1971).
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applicable to administrative proceedings, and held an
administrative agency bound on remand to apply the legal
principles laid down by the appellate court.

It expressly

distinguished Pottsville Broadcasting, and held that while
ordinarily a court may not direct an administrative agency
to reach a particular result, that limitation does not
preclude the application of the doctrine of
case" on review of administrative orders.

11

law of the

Id.

In Chicago

& Northwestern, the Seventh Circuit further expressly held
that Pottsville Broadcasting itself requires an administrative
agency on remand to apply the legal principles laid down
by the court.
The D.C. Circuit in City of Cleveland v.
Federal Power Commission, 561 F.2d 344 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
also expressly held Pottsville Broadcasting inapplicable to
an agency determination which violates the letter or spirit
of the mandate of an appellate court.

Citing Pottsville

Broadcasting, the Court held:
We are mindful that 1'an administrative determination
in which is imbedded a legal question open to judicial
review does not impliedly foreclose the administrative
agency, after its error has been corrected, from
enforcing the legislative policy committed to its
charge." . • . To this stage of the litigation,
however, only purely legal questions have emerged
and no aspect of congressional policy is involved,
certainly as yet.
561 F.2d at 346-47, n. 24

(citations omitted).

City of

Cleveland thus held:
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The decision of a federal appellate court establishes the law binding further action in the litigation by another body subject to its authority.
The
latter "is without power to do anything which is
contrary to either the letter or spirit of the mandate
construed in the light of the opinion of [the] court
deciding the case," and the higher tribunal is amply
armed to rectify any deviation through the process
of mandamus.
"That approach," we have said, "may
appropriately be utilized to correct a misconception
of the scope and effect of the appellate decision."
These principles, so familiar in operation within the
hierarchy of judicial benches, indulge no exception
for reviews of administrative agencies.
Id. at 346.

See Service Employees International Union

v. National Labor Relations Board, 640 F.2d 1042, 1045-46
(9th Cir. 1981).
This Court has itself broadly stated its powers to
make legal determinations, and the duty of the Public
Service Commission to follow them:
Notwithstanding the acknowledged powers of the
Commission, and the deference accorded its powers,
the statutes governing its procedure provide for a
review by this court.
This clearly indicates that no
"rule of infallibility" should apply.
Such a standard,
or any pretention thereto, would be difficult to live
up to.
It is to be assumed that the duty imposed on
this court was intended to be a substantial and
responsible review of the proceedings of the Commission
and not a mere pro forrna rubber-stamping of its
actions.
That is the basis for the rule referred to
above that the Commission's action will not be sustained if it is so without foundation in fact or
reason that it must be deemed capricious and arbitrary.
Williams v. Public Service Commission, 29 Utah 2d 9, 13,
504 P.2d 34, 37 {1972)

(citations omitted).

See also Silver

Beehive Telephone Co., Inc. v. Public Service Commission,
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30 Utah 2d 44, 512 P.2d 1327 (1973); Lake Shore Motor Coach
Lines, Inc. v. Welling, 9 Utah 2d 114, 339 P.2d 1011 (1959).
Finally, if this Court had "fashioned a remedy,"
it would have acted within its power to review an administrative agency.

Appellate courts do indeed have the power

to fashion administrative remedies in certain circumstances.
See Democratic Central Committee, supra, at 823-29;
National Labor Relations Board v. Madison Courier, Inc., 505
F.2d 391, 398-99 (D.C. Cir. 1974).

While this Court 1 s

decision did not fashion a remedy, but only declared clear
legal principles with certain inexorable results, as a
matter of sheer power the law would not foreclose the court
from fashioning remedies.

III.

Id.

SECTION 54-7-10 (1), ALLOWING THE COMMISSION TO
APPROVE SETTLEMENTS, ADDS NOTHING TO THIS INQUIRY
BECAUSE EVEN THE STIPULATING PARTIES ADMIT THAT
'11HE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION CAN ONLY APPROVE
LAWFUL SETTLEMENTS.
The respondents argue that settlements are favored

in the law, and expressly sanctioned by Utah Code Ann.
§54-7-10(1).

Of course settlements are favored generally,

and the Commission probably did not need §54-7-10(1) to
give it authority to approve lawful settlements.

But that

authority does not and cannot give the Commission the
power to approve a settlement contrary to the law of the
case and the mandate of this Court.

Gorgoza v. Utah State

Road Commission, 553 P.2d 413 (Utah 1976).
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No case cited by any party supports the proposition
that a reviewing court must sanction a settlement contrary
to law or to a mandate.

It is an absurd proposition.

In

fact, none of the cases cited by the Stipulating Parties or
the Shareholder Association to show that settlements are
favored has anything to do with settlement of a case after
appellate reversal and remand.
All of the parties admit that §54-7-10(1) does not
go so far as to allow a settlement contrary to law.

Joint

Brief at 25, n. 14; Mountain Fuel Brief at 33; Shareholder
Association Brief at 7-8.

Thus, Section 54-7-10(1) adds

nothing to the inquiry here--whether the Commission approved
the settlement of this matter contrary to the dictates of
this Court and the law.

IV.

CONTRARY TO THE STIPULATING PARTIES' POSITION
THAT ALL MATTERS WERE DEALT WITH CONSISTENTLY
WITH THIS COURT'S POSITION, THE CO.MMISSION DID
NOT EVEN PURPORT TO DECIDE WHETHER 110UNTAIN FUEL
COULD DIVIDE ITS UTILITY OIL AND GAS EXPLOR~TION
AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM WITH A SUBSIDIARY.
Mountain Fuel states:

[T]hat Stipulation and Agreement, and the order of the
PSC approving same, clearly meet both the strict legal
requirements of the Wexpro decision, as well as the
more general observations of the Court herein.
Mountain Fuel Brief at 41.

The Division and the Conunittee

state:
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[T]he settlement was in the public interest and its
terms complied with the law as declared by this Court
in its Wexpro decision.
Joint Brief at 5.
However, in this Court's decision in the critical
footnote 8, this Court expressly held that the Commission
must decide
the serious issue of whether it is in the public interest for Mountain Fuel to divide its utility function
between itself and a subsidiary.
Relevant factors to
be considered in this inquiry include any potential
administrative inconvenience caused by the necessity
of regulating the two corporate entities performing,
in essence, a singular utility function; and additional costs and expenses affecting th~ rate base.
595 P.2d at 878, n.

8.

In wholesale contravention of that

legal pronouncement, the Stipulation and Agreement

were

presented to the Commission on the assumption that unregulated subsidiaries of the utility, and not the utility
itself, would explore for and develop hydrocarbons.

The

acceptance by the Commission of that assumption, without an
inquiry into whether the assumption is in the public interest,
violated the Supreme Court's express mandate that there must
be consideration by the Conunission of this "serious issue"
if Mountain Fuel is to try to divide its utility function
with a subsidiary.
hearing.

That issue was never set down for a

No consideration was given that issue by the

Cormnission.

No finding on it was made.

Instead, the Corn-

mission merely assumed, in a capricious manner, what it was
ordered to determine.
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Moreover, no consideration was given to the corollary question whether, because Mountain Fuel refuses to
conduct exploration and development as a utility function,
Mountain Fuel should not be required to divest itself of its
hydrocarbon exploration and development assets for market
value to third parties.
Mountain Fuel and Wexpro admit this to the Court:
During the pendency of the Case before the
Commission on remand, numerous problems and practical
considerations required MFS to make certain business
decisions and to advise the Commission that the sweep
of the majority Opinion of the Supreme Court in
Wexpro had made it virtually impossible for the
Company to conduct a utility exploration and development program or to raise new investment capital for
that purpose. . . .
Mountain Fuel Brief at 11 (emphasis added).

This is the

same fait accompli propounded throughout the Joint Brief and
Mountain Fuel's Brief, i.e., that there was no possibility
of Mountain Fuel conducting a utility exploration and development program.
In short, the acceptance of the Stipulation and
Agreement by the Commission involved a·monumental begging of
the question whether Wexpro and Celsius should even exist--a
question which the Court directed be examined rather than
begged.
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V.

THE CANCELLATION OF THE JOINT EXPLORATION AGREEMENT AFTER THIS COURT'S DECISION DID NOT MOOT
THE QUESTION WHETHER THE TRANSFER OF PROPERTIES
TO WEXPRO WAS IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST.
At pages 9-10 of their answering brief, Mountain

Fuel and Wexpro again tacitly admit the Stipulation and
Agreement were not intended to comply with this Court's
decision, when they contend that:
Soon after the issuance of the majority opinion,
Wexpro availed itself of the option and terminated the
Joint Exploration Agreement • . . thus making moot the
question of whether the 1976 transfer and proposed
exploration program were detrimental to the MFS customer, in the public interest, or for market value.
Not only does this contention demonstrate Mountain Fuel's
position that this Court's decision was moot and not necessary
to abide by, the contension is false and based on a false
premise.

The Joint Exploration Agreement applied to Mountain

Fuel's 2.9 million wildcat acres which had not been trans£erred to Wexpro under the Purchase and Sale Agreement.

The

cancellation of the Joint Exploration Agreement obviously
could not moot the question whether Wexpro should exist as
an oil and gas exploration company or whether the transfer
of properties to Wexpro was in the public interest, because
even after the Joint Exploration Agreement was cancelled,
Wexpro continued to hold the purchase and sale acreage.

To

understand how vital, rather than moot, the question really
is, this Court must understand that even though the Court
invalidated the original Purchase and Sale Agreement, the
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properties unlawfully transferred to Wexpro have never been
transferred back to Mountain Fuel.

The Agreement states:

Certain of the properties described in this Agreement were the subject of the conveyance from
Mountain Fuel Supply Company to Wexpro under the
Agreement of Purchase and Sale and have been held,
operated and owned by Wexpro since the effective
date of that Agreement.
Except as provided in this
Agreement to the contrary, such properties will be
and remain the sole and exclusive property of
Wexpro.
Agreement 'VII-2, R. 03613-14.

VI.

THE INABILITY OF MOUNTAIN FUEL TO OPERATE A
JOINT DRILLING PROGRAM WITH RATEPAYERS IS DUE
NOT TO ECONOMIC IMPOSSIBILITY OR IMPRACTICALITY
BUT TO ITS OWN REFUSAL TO DO SO.
Mountain Fuel miscites the testimony of John F.

O'Leary.

Mountain Fuel states that Mr. O'Leary's testimony

is that a joint program between the utility and a nonregulated entity will not work.

Mountain Fuel Brief at 20.

Mr. O'Leary's actual testimony, however, was that a joint
program will not work due to the

"unwillingness'~

of Mountain

Fuel and the shareholders.
A ••.• I'm pretty sure that if we were [to] find ourselves in a contentious situation in which the
Commission attempted to force on an unwilling
management a prescription for exploration that
that set of skills would go elsewhere.
And I
think in consequence it would not be a satisfactory experiment from the standpoint of the
Conunission's overall objectives.
Q. Have there, however, been instances in your
experience that you know of where such a--let's
call it a joint endeavor has taken place and has
been successful?
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A. Yes.
I don't think that there's any inherent
disability on the part of almost any form of
organization to conduct a successful exploratory
activity. We find, for example, next week I'll
be dealing with- a French company that is owned
by the French government in part. And it conducts
its affairs in a thoroughly businesslike manner.
And despite the fact that it's roughly 50%
owned by its government it goes--proceeds with
its business and is a very efficient and effective
company in the field of exploration and development.
Similarly I deal with companies in Venezuela and Mexico that are nationalized, that are
products of the government. And they work, so
far as I can see, well.
The essence of the
matter there is one of willingness.
Q. There's nothing un-American or nefarious
about such a joint endeavor then as I understand
you?
A. No. . . • And we found that from the very beginning of electric power production in this country
municipals have stood side by side with privatelyowned, investor-owned corporations and done, so far
as I can see, just as well.
I don't think that
there's any magic to private sector ownership or
public sector ownership.
I think the magic is
willingness.
R. 01311-12

(emphasis added).

The reason there will- be no utility exploration
and development program was given by counsel for the Division
when he explained the Stipulation and Agreement:
COM. CAMERON: Does that mean that the utility
will not in the future participate in exploration?
MR. ANDERSON: It does.
One of the foundation
facts made very clear to us at the outset of our
engagement and since then and in no uncertain terms
is that there will be no return to the status quo.
Mountain Fuel Supply as a utility is out of the
oil and gas exploration business, not as a result
of this settlement but as a result of their own decisions made previously and subsequent to the Utah
Supreme Court case May 10, 1979. The subsidiary,
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Wexpro, or its successors or assigns will be entitled
to conduct an oil and gas development program for
shareholders free of any utility regulation.
R. 00957 (emphasis added).
There is really no fair reason for the shareholders'
unwillingness.

Nothing in this Court's decision prevents

the shareholders from putting up their own money in the
future, investing in their own oil and gas exploration and
development with investor funds, and receiving all the
profits therefrom.

If the shareholders desire to so risk

their own money in the future, they will not be limited to a
utility rate of return.
What they cannot do is take unregulated profits
from ratepayer-financed activity.

VII.

CONTRARY TO THE STIPULATING PARTIES' POSITION
THAT WEXPRO'S STATUS IS UNRESOLVED, THE STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT REQUIRE, IN CONTRAVENTION
OF THE LAW OF THE CASE AND OF THIS STATE, THAT
WEXPRO BE UNREGULATED.
The Division and the Conunittee state that the

Stipulation and Agreement do not resolve the issue of whether
Wexpro is a utility.

Division Brief at 16, n. 10.

statement is patently false.

This

The Stipulation provides:

Wexpro should be recognized by states in which it
operates and all parties as an independent hydrocarbon
exploration and development company which is not subject to state public utility regulation and which
legally owns or operates the Properties in accordance with the Agreement.
Stipulation

~2.4,

R.03553.
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None of the parties will claim that the Properties
owned by Wexpro are subject to the public utility regulation of any state, and all parties will cooperate to
obtain legal rulings and, if necessary, statutes so
providing.
It is acknowledged that the Company's
rights with respect to the Properties or benefits from
them may be subject to appropriate regulation for
ratemaking purposes.
However, that fact will in no
way be claimed by any party as a basis for state
public utility regulation of Wexpro in any of its
activities with respect to the Properties.
If
Wexpro 1 s activities with respect to the Properties
are claimed by the parties to be or are successfully
subjected to state public utility regulation, Wexpro
will be released from its obligations under the
Agreement with respect to the Properties which subject
it to regulation.
Stipulation tll.2, R.03566.
This directly contravenes this Court's decision
that:
A review of the provisions of the two agreements as
modified by the Commission clearly indicates that, by
the activities performed by Wexpro, it becomes a public
utility subject to the jurisdiction and regulation of
the Commission. . . . .
595 P.2d at 878.

The Stipulating Parties, with the approval of the
Commission, have simply flaunted that holding.

VIII.

CONTRARY TO THE POSITION OF THE STIPULATING
· PARTIES, MOUNTAIN FUEL'S REJECTED SYSTEM OF
CLASSIFICATION IS A CRITICAL FACTOR IN THE
STIPULATION AND AGREEMENT.
The Division and the Cormnittee argue that the

Department "attempts to find an issue" in the Stipulation
and Agreement 1 s use of Mountain Fuel's rejected classification system.

Joint Brief at 12.

Mountain Fuel argues
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that the question of classification is "mooted" since it was
ostensibly assumed for settlement purposes that the Commission had jurisdiction over all properties included in the
transaction.

Mountain Fuel Brief at 41.

No analysis is given in support of those arguments.
In fact, the classification has critical consequences to
the Stipulation and Agreement.

Such consequences are contrary

to this Court's decision, which rejected the classification
system as a basis for allocating benefits of oil and gas
exploration and development between ratepayers and shareholders.
The settlement perpetuates that system by basing
the "consideration" given for different classes of properties
solely on their status as oil or gas properties under Mountain
Fuel's rejected system.

Thus, Mountain Fuel will pay its

subsidiary market prices on gas from exploratory properties
and after-acquired properties, but cost-of-service prices
on gas from "productive oil" reservoirs.

Thus Mountain Fuel

obtains a 7% overriding royalty interest on hydrocarbons
extracted from exploratory properties,but 2.5% on hydrocarbons
extracted from the so-called "after-acquired properties."
Thus Mountain Fuel obtains 54% of the net profits from
"productive oil" reservoirs, but it receives overriding
royalty interests on exploratory formations and after-acquired
properties.

Joint Brief at 12-18, expressly adopted in

Mountain Fuel Brief at 13.
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If there were really no difference under the Stipulation and Agreement whether properties were "gas" or "oil",
or if it were really assumed that all properties are utility
assets, there would be no reasonable basis for those differences in "consideration."

Either the classification system

is used unlawfully, or the "market consideration" paid for
the properties is inherently irrational.
Moreover, the Stipulating Parties' repeated
statement that all properties were implicitly "assumed" to
be utility properties is false.

When arguing the Agreement's

largesse to ratepayers, the Stipulating Parties state that
some properties involved in the Stipulation and Agreement,
including the "after-acquired properties," were not utility
assets.

Joint Brief at 17.
There is certainly no lawful basis for the assump-

tion that they are "non-utility."

In fact, it was the

Division's contention on remand that under this Court's
decision the "after-acquired properties" were utility assets.
The Division stated:
The properties "acquired" by Wexpro from sources
other than Mountain Fuel ("after-acquired" properties)
• . • are themselves utility assets and the ratepayer
reduction or refund must include the net profits from
these assets as well.
Division Hearing Brief on Remand, R. 02487 (emphasis added).
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IX.

MOUNTAIN FUEL'S PURCHASE OF GAS FROM CELSIUS
AT MARKET PRICE VIOLATES THE NO-PROFITS-TOAFFILIATES RULE.
The Division mischaracterizes this Court's decision

in this case when it states:
The only aspect of the prior arrangement which
this Court found violative of the rule was that
Wexpro was permitted to charge market prices for gas
from properties for which it paid book value.
Joint Brief at 38 (emphasis added).

The Division and the

Committee then go on to argue that since the transfers were
for fair market value, the rule does not apply.
This Court did not intimate that the book value
transfer was a necessary predicate to its holding.

Moreover,

not only does the purported limitation of the no-profits-toaffiliates rule misconceive the holding of this Court, it is
contradicted by the very case law cited by this Court in its
decision.

This Court cited for the no-profits-to-affiliates

rule Cities Service Gas Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 424
F.2d 411 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. dismissed, 400 U.S. 801 (1970),
which stated:
A regulated utility may not impose unnecessary
costs upon its consumers. See Acker v. United States,
298 U.S. 426, 430-31, 56 s.ct. 824, 80 L.Ed. 1257,
and El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 5 Cir., 281 F.2d 567, 573, cert. denied California
v. Federal Power Commission, 366 U.S. 912, 81 S.Ct.
1083, 6 L.Ed:2d 236.
If the properties in question
had been retained by Gas Company or an affiliate,
cost of service would have determined the rate. We
believe.t~at the alienation of the properties to a
non-affiliate, even though made in good faith and
for value, does not change the situation.
Id. at 417 (emphasis added).
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X.

THE STIPULATING PARTIES TAKE BASELESS, CONVENIENT
AND CONTRADICTORY POSITIONS ABOUT THE VALUE OF
THE INTEGRATED PACKAGE OF BENEFITS AND THE
INDIVIDUAL BENEFITS CONTAINED THEREIN.
A.

The Stipulating Parties' reliance on the

7% overriding royalty interest as both fair market consideration for utility assets and a beneficial reduction from the
market price of gas is disingenuous.
The Stipulating Parties repeatedly argue that the
7% overriding royalty interest represents fair market consideration for the transfer of the "wildcat acreage."
Mountain Fuel states:
Indeed, virtually every experienced witness who took
the stand, testified unequivocally that . . . the
7% overriding royalty with a call on the gas constituted market value for the transfer of the exploration
acreage.
Mountain Fuel Brief at 27.

This portion of Mountain Fuel's

Brief is expressly adopted by the Divison and the Committee.
Joint Brief at 6.

See also Mountain Fuel Brief at 17, 26,

29, 43; Joint Brief at 42-44.
However, in trying to rationalize market price
for gas, the 7% is magically converted from a fair market
value payment for assets to a reduction from market price
for gas:
The utility will also receive a 7% overriding
royalty interest on all oil and gas produced from the
wildcat acreage (Stipulation §3.3.4), which will
assuredly result in net gas costs at substantially
below market prices.
Mountain Fuel Brief at 42.

See also Joint Brief at 17, 18,

22.
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The parties therefore use the same 7% royalty twice
in "explaining" the benefits to ratepayers.

This "double-

dipping" is disingenuous at best.
B.

The valuable call on gas and unspecified

other benefits may well disappear in the future.
While the Stipulating Parties argue that the
call on gas from transferred properties is an important
benefit, Joint Brief at 22, 46; Mountain Fuel Brief at 42,
the Stipulation and Agreement in fact provide that if the
no-profits-to-affiliates rule applies, .Mountain Fuel loses
its call.

Agreement 'IV-6(c), R. 03610-11.

In addition, if

any party to the settlement challenges the status of Wexpro
as an independent non-regulated entity, Wexpro is released
from its obligations with respect to the properties that
subject it to regulation.

Stipulation '11.2, R. 03566.

Thus, considering the settlement terms as an integrated
whole, there is a potential for an unknown quantum of reduction in benefits to ratepayers in return for the t~ansfer of
oil and gas properties, and no clear provision for what
happens if Wexpro is released from the Agreement.
C.

There is no basis in the record for the

contention that the provision of cost-of-service gas will
benefit the ratepayers two billion dollars over the next
20 years.
The Division and the Committee cite Exhibit S-2
in support of their contention that "[b]y protecting this
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gas from the FERC's NGPA pricing, the ratepayers are
benefited nearly Two Billion Dollars ($2,000,000,000) over
the next twenty (20) years."
omitted).

Joint Brief at 20 (footnote

Exhibit S-2 is a letter from Washington D.C.

counsel regarding the risks of continued litigation.

Nowhere

in Exhibit S-2 is there any reference to, let alone credible
support for, any dollar value of cost-of-service gas, certainly
not $2,000,000,000.

In fact, during the remand hearings,

counsel for the Division, in explaining the benefits to the
Commission, stated:
With that underscored caveat, that we are speculating, even though on as informed a basis as possible,
we can tell you and those interested here that the
impact package we are talking about will be somewhere
between four and five hundred million dollars, broken
down as follows:
the share of revenues from Wexpro,
approximately $200 million, maybe plus; the share
from wildcat properties which are subsequently
explored and we hope--all parties hope, brought into
production, perhaps another $150 million, and that is
a conservative figure we feel . . . •
R. 00954-55.
be puffing.

Four to five hundred million dollars may well
It is hardly permissible puffing or argument

to inflate that figure, without any evidentiary support, to
two billion dollars.
D.

Contrary to the arguments of the Stipulating

Parties, the ratepayers under the Stipulation and Agreement
will subsidize the risk of Wexpro's oil and gas exploration
program.
The Division and the Committee argue that:
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No expense will be allowed in any rate p~id by MFS
customers which is traceable to exploration or
development expense.
Joint Brief at 37.

Mountain Fuel argues to the same effect.

Mountain Fuel Brief at 16.

This contention is false.

The

answering briefs themselves not only admit, but emphasize,
that Wexpro will receive "risk premiums" to compensate for
the risk of drilling.
If they find new gas, an incremental incentive allowance (8% on successful, commercial gas wells and 5%
on successful oil wells) is provided for (Agreement
§§II-8, III-5) to help compensate for these costs
[of drilling dry holes] and the dry-hole risks.
Mountain Fuel Brief

a~

57 (emphasis added).

See also Joint

Brief at 16, n. 9, where the Division and the Committee
explain:
To the extent that development drilling is successful, a five percent (5%) premium will be allowed in
addition to the base rate of return ·on investment in
successful wells to compensate for the risk of developmental drilling . . . . (Emphasis added.)
The ratepayers are in fact defraying the costs of
unsuccessful exploration--in other words, paying compensation
for the risks -of dr}" holes.

4.

-~/

The Stipulating Parties argue that the ratepayers
will pay nothing traceable toward the risk of exploration and development when that is a convenient argument to show great ratepayer benefit.
However, when
it becomes necessary to rationalize the "risk premiums,"
those parties admit they are to defray risk.
Neither
the Division nor Mountain Fuel even attempts to reconcile this contradiction.
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XI.

THE STIPULATING PARTIES MISCHARACTERIZED AND
MISQUOTED ARGUMENTS MADE BY THE DEPARTMENT
IN ITS BRIEF.
The Division and the Committee in their Joint Brief

list what are supposed to be six inaccuracies contained in
the Department's original brief in this appeal.

Each pur-

ported inaccuracy is quoted and underlined in the Joint
Brief.

None of the six is an accurate quotation.

Not only

are the Department•s points misquoted, but they are either
taken out of context, mischaracterized, or inaccurately
argued to be erroneous.

In fact, each of the Department's

statements is absolutely correct.
Mountain Fuel and Wexpro also mischaracterize the
Department's arguments and falsely try to refute them.

For

the sake of brevity, the Department herein sets forth only
the most blatant falsehoods and false quotations.
A.

Mountain Fuel in its Brief at page 58

cites as false the Department's statement that the producing
oil reservoirs, originally transferred to Wexpro under the
original Purchase and Sale Agreement, "will be and remain
the sole and exclusive property" of Wexpro.

The Department

took this supposedly "false" contention right out of the
Agreement, which states:
Schedule 2(a) sets forth a complete list of productive oil reservoirs.
Any right, title and interest to the properties
described on Schedules 2(a) and 2(b) and the corresponding leases, oper-atfng rights, wells and
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appurtenant facilities held by Wexpro will be and
remain the sole and exclusive property of Wexpro
Agreement ,1,[II-1 and II-2, R. 03595 (emphasis added).
B.

The Division quotes the Department as saying:

The Division gave up its right to represent
the public interest before the Commission.
Joint Brief at 8.
ment's Brief.

The Joint Brief misquotes the Depart-

The Department stated that:

The Division, without legislative authority, gave
up its power to challenge actions of Mountain Fuel,
Wexpro or Celsius in violation of its duties to
represent the public interest before the Commission.
Department Brief at 10.

The Department is not arguing and

never has argued that the Division gave up all its authority
to represent the public interest before the Commission.
However, the Division uncontrovertedly gives up, under the
Stipulation and Agreement, its power to challenge the actions
of Mountain Fuel, Wexpro or Celsius.

Stipulation

,f ,I 5. 2,

11. 2,

12, 15.4, R. 03556, 03566-67, 03570.
C.

The Division quotes the Department as stating:

MFS's exploration program ended when the
settlement was approved.
Joint Brief at 9.

The Department actually stated:

In contravention of the law, the Stipulation and
Agreement lead immediately to the end of Mountain
Fuel's utility exploration and development program.
Department Brief at 12.

The quote is inaccurate, and the

Department's statement is correct.

What's more, Mountain
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Fuel's unilateral cessation of its exploration program in
1980 makes the situation worse, not better, for the Stipulating Parties.

Ceasing the program without approval of the

Public Service Commission was contrary to the law of the
State of Utah.

In any event, the record could not be more

clear that under the Stipulation and Agreement the utility
will not be exploring and developing hydrocarbons.
XII.

THE PETITION BY THE SHAREHOLDER ASSOCIATION IS
A SHAM AND ARGUMENTS CONCERNING RES JUDICATA
ARE NOT APPROPRIATELY BEFORE THLS COURT ON THIS
APPEAL.
The positions of the Shareholder Association and

Mountain Fuel regarding the res judicata effect of the
Commission Order do not involve a real controversy and
cannot be considered by this Court on this appeal.

In fact,

if there is a controversy, the Shareholder Association
which is in part funded by Mountain Fuel, and Mountain Fuel
which is as a matter of course aided by the Shareholder
Association in legal disputes, are on the same side.

That

is obvious from a reading of the Shareholder Association's
answering brief which makes the very same arguments as
Mountain Fuel and Wexpro.
The Shareholder Association is asking this Court
for an advisory opinion.

There is simply no issue in this

case which makes it appropriate for the Court to rule upon
the res judicata effect of the Report and Order.

The Share-

holder Association cannot show that it has sustained or that
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it is immediately in danger of sustaining any direct injury
as a result of the supposed lack of finality herein.

See

Baird v. State of Utah, 574 P.2d 713, 717 (Utah 1978); see
also Hoyle v. Monson, 606 P.2d 240 (Utah 1980); Koer v.
Mayfair Markets, 19 Utah 2d 339, 431 P.2d 566 (1967).
All parties arguing in favor of res judicata,
including the Stipulating Parties and the Shareholder
Association, seek the same thing--a fiat by this Court that
the Order is final and binding.

The Shareholder Association

argues that notwithstanding language to the contrary in the
Report and Order, the Report and Order is not final enough
to suit it.

Mountain Fuel counters with an argument that

the Order is final.

Clearly they seek the same thing--

something this Court cannot provide--a declaration that the
order is res judicata and precludes a future Commission from
redetermining the issues involved in this appeal.

Such a

determination must await an actual case or controversy, if
ever that should arise, that puts that issue squarely before
the Court.
f'-

Respectfully submitted this 23rd day of August,
1982.
GIAUQUE

By

&

WILLIAMS

e
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October 15, 1981

The Honorable Public Service Commission
ATTEN7ION: Chairman Milly 0. Bernard
·330 East 400 South Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Re:

In the Matter of the Petition of the.Division
of Public Utilities to Consider the Prooosed
Transfer of Certain Wells, Etc. of Moun~ain Fuel
Supply Company to Wexpro Company on Remand from
the Utah Supreme Court,- Case No. 76-057-14

Honorable Corr.missioners:
The following is furnished in response to the request of
Chairman Bernard for a brief Slli-nrr,arv of the benefits flowinc to
the .ratepayers as a result of the p~oposed settlement of th~
t\exprc litigations, which settlement is presently !Jeing considered
by the Cornrnission:
1.

""

An End of Litigation.

Assuming that the complex litigations involving the
Wexpro issues continued for five ~ears at the level of effort experienced during the past nine months (with the ratepayer essentially paying for counsel and experts on both sides}, the
total cost to the ratepayer would easily exceed $7,000.000 for
attorney and witness fees. This ~7,000,000 does not include the
value of lost opportunity in the exploration and development
program or the delay in receiving a return fro~ the various properties.
2.

54% of the Net Profits from the Oil

P~ooerties.

We estimate that this benefit will be approximately
SlO - 20,000,000 per year for the next 10 to 15 years. This
estimate is very speculative since one cannot preGict wha~ wi~l
happe
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3.

Cost of Service Gas from the Oil Reservoirs.

Durl.ng his testimony, 1'!r. Roseman estimated that :
cost of service gas produced by Mountain Fuel and its subsidiaries
would be approximately $2.00 per Mcf during the near future and
that the market price of such gas would be $5 - 6 per Mcf.
~ountain Fuel Supply's 1980 Annual Report indicates a current
production of gas from its Wexpro property to be approximately
2.5 million Mcf. That production should increase significantly
as oil production gradually tails off and Wexpro begins to produce
the gas reservoirs on those sa..rne properties~ However, assuming
the 2. 5 m~llion Mcf annually and a cost of service/market price
differen~ial of $3.00 per Mcf, the~net benefit to the ratepayer
would be $7,500,000 per annum.
This calculation involves numerous
~ssumptions concerning inflation in cost of production and market
?rices and thus is speculative.
4.

Elimination of Exoloration Allowances and Rates.

We are informed that there is currently approximately
$3,000,000 in Mountain.Fuel's retail gas rates reflecting an exploration allowance.
It is estimated that in ·time this. exploration
allowance would have to increase several fold. By shareholders
bearing the total exploration risk and expense, the per annum
benefit to ratepayers is $ 3, 0.00, 000+ - at the current rate and· whatever increases the Commission might estimate as being reasonable
with respect to future projections.
5.

Carryinq Cost of 101 and 105 Leases.

Approximately $4 - 5,000,000 per annum will be eliminated from rates •.
6.
7% overriding Royalty on Production from Exploration
on Leases Currently Held in the 101 and 105 Accounts.
To value the overriding royalty, one must make assumptions concerning the revenue produced from hydroc~rbons found.on
these properties.
Such projections are of necessity.speculative.
Assumino however that exploration on these properties resulted
eventually in gro~s revenues of $100,?00,000.per ann~m. (t~is wa~
the estimate used by Mr. Roserran in his testimony ana is wexpro s
current revenues) it would result in a benefit to the ratepayer
of $7,000,000 per annum.
7.

Right to Purchase Gas from the Exoloration Prooerties.

The Agreement provides that the utility will have a
first right of purchase on ~11 gas oroduced from the 101/105
11
exploration properties and the 128,000+ acres of "after-acquired

~~~P"~_£~~~i:~~~~,,0~ir~~~~~~ p~~~i~!~e~~~t t~h~~= ~~~~~:~:~
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E:om this provision would be an assured future supply of gas.
8 •. Cost of Service Gas from the Currently Producing
Gas Reservoirs on the Account 101 Properties.
Mountain Fuel currently produces approximately
50,000,000 Mcf from its 101 properties at an average cost of
service of 67¢ per Mcf.
Mr. Roseman estimated that the development program might increase the production f rorn these properties
by another 50,000,000 Mcf per annum at a cost of service price
of approximately $2.00 per Mcf. Assuming, as we did on the Wexpro
gas, a differential between cost of service and market prices of
$3.00 per Mcf, this right to cost
service gas could easily be
worth $300,000,000 per annum.
It should be noted that this was
gas over which Mountain Fuel was attempting to obtain FERC jurisdiction and NGPA/deregulated prices.

of

9.
2~ Percent Overriding Roval ty on Ce::-tai:i ":·;ildcat"
Acreage Acquired by Wexpro Between January 1, 1977 and May 10,
1979 and Certain Additional Acreage Associated with the "Bug
Field".
Once again we are speculating as to revenues :rom
exploration of "wildcat" acreage.
If we assume that this acreage
produces revenues in the-neighborhood of $10,000,000 per annum
the 2~ percent royalty would produce·a $250,000 a~~ual benefit
to the ratepayer.
·

10.

21 Million Dollar Reduction in Cost of Service.

The Agreement provides that over the first 12 months
following approval of the Agreement there will be a $21,000,000
.::-eduction in cost of service which we calculate gives apprc:>:i:nately
$50. 00 _to the average residential ratepayer.
·· ···
11.

Special Rate Reduction.

The last paragraph of the.Agreement provides for a
special rate reduction of $250,000.00 per year for 12 years.
12. There is one other benefit which has been negotiated
but is very difficult to quantify.
The Agreement provides that
future allocation between gas and oil of depreciation and costs
associated with the oroducing properties will be done on a "market"
rather than a "BTU" basis.
'l'his will result in the first year in ~
an allocation of 100 percent more costs and depreciati~n to the
oil and away from the gas than in the immediately previous year.
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I hope that this is responsive to the questions you had
concerning the b.enefi ts accruing to the ratepayer as the result
of the proposed settlement agreemen~ and stipulation.
Very truly yours,
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

Thomas A. Quinn
TAQ/as

-.
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